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During the first week of December, the U.S. President brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. He promised an end to long-standing fighting in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting method for violence emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, targeting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President warned, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

This contrast exemplifies the core feature of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and conflict resolution—even as this squares with the nascent military strikes in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a senior U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative stated this, noting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Inconsistencies

This shift is significant, but experts note it is early to gauge its impact. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis forecasts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Apathy and Strains

In contrast to his predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant disagreement has developed with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Relations and Targeted Action

A comparable standoff emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the harsh rhetoric may have spurred the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

Similar to Other Powers

Some analysts describe the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the current policy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.